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Since the 1990s, there has been much discussion about how concepts are learned
and processed. Many researchers believe that the experienced bodily states (i.e.,
embodied experiences) should be an important factor that affects concepts’ learning
and use, and metaphorical mappings between abstract concepts, such as TIME and
POWER, and concrete concepts, such as SPATIAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURED
EXPERIENCEs, etc., suggest the abstract-concrete concepts’ connections. In most of
the recent literature, we can find common elements (e.g., concrete concepts) shared
by different abstract-concrete metaphorical expressions. Therefore, we assumed that
mappings might also be found between two abstract concepts that share common
elements, though they have no symbolic connections. In the present study, two lexical
decision tasks were arranged and the priming effect between TIME and ABSTRACT
ACTIONs was used as an index to test our hypothesis. Results showed a robust
priming effect when a target verb and its prime belonged to the same duration
type (TIME consistent condition). These findings suggest that mapping between
concepts was affected by common elements. We propose a dynamic model in which
mappings between concepts are influenced by common elements, including symbolic
or embodied information. What kind of elements (linguistic or embodied) can be used
would depend on how difficult it is for a concept to be learned or accessed.
Keywords: common elements, abstract action, time, length, mapping
INTRODUCTION
What is LOVE? We cannot see it or touch it, but can only feel it or experience it. “An individual’s
concept of LOVE depends on both his or her own experiences plus the metaphorical concepts for
LOVE provided by the culture” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 206). Then what kind of information
can people get from their experience? Using the concept LOVE as an example, we never really
experience what love (i.e., abstract concept) is, but learn what we will do (i.e., concrete concepts
and the relevant related experiences, such as KISS, ARGUE, FIGHT, etc.), when we are in LOVE.
By doing so, we build up the concept LOVE. As a consequence, researchers are interested in how
people think about things they have never experienced, and the notion of embodiment has been
offered as a possible solution to this problem. The main idea underlying embodiment is that higher
cognitive processes rely heavily on the brain’s modality-specific systems and on actual bodily states
(Niedenthal et al., 2005). According to the strong embodied approach, researchers believe that
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cognitive processes such as concept learning and concept
use involve partial reactivations of the sensory-motor states
(i.e., simulation) that occur during experience with the world
(Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal et al., 2009).
In most of the recent literatures, the view of embodiment was
discussed based on the idea of conceptual metaphors (Santiago
et al., 2011). The embodiment view of abstract concepts has its
origins in conceptual metaphor theory, which emerged within
cognitive linguistics with a stronger focus on representation than
on processing (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Johnson, 1987;
Gibbs and O’Brien, 1990). For example, according to what was
in our conceptual schema built by experience, we have some
metaphorical sayings for LOVE, such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY
or LOVE IS WAR. When people use the “A is B” metaphor, A
is considered as the target domain while B is the source domain
(Lakoff, 1993). The source domain (e.g., JOURNEY) lays the
foundation for the concept, which in its turn forms mappings,
or conceptual metaphors. The conceptual metaphor will further
provide a whole number of linguistic expressions, or as we might
call them linguistic metaphors, that finally deliver the idea to
the target domain (e.g., LOVE). In other words, “the human
conceptual apparatus may look like the Empire State Building:
a rock-solid structure where upper (more abstract) floors are
supported by lower (more concrete) floors” (Santiago et al., 2011,
p. 43).
However, it is still not clear whether embodied experience
was involved in mappings between these abstract and concrete
concepts. Some researchers have argued that sensorimotor
system activation or experiences during language processing are
not as necessary as those mentioned by the strong embodied
approach for comprehension (for reviews, see Sakreida et al.,
2013). Using fMRI as an index, Sakreida et al. (2013) claimed
that concrete word processing relies more on the sensorimotor
system, whereas abstract word processing relies more on the
linguistic system, though the sensorimotor neural network was
found to be engaged in both concrete and abstract language
contents in their study. These processing differences between
concrete and abstract concepts can be also captured when
the processing of phrases is discussed (Scorolli et al., 2012).
According to the strong embodied approach and its opposite
view, we believe that there might be a possible combination:
Reactivations of the sensory-motor states, or so-called sensory-
motor states in Sakreida et al.s’ (2013) study, are indirectly
involved in abstract concepts’ learning and use, while the concrete
concepts act as mediators.
By analyzing discussions about the metaphorical expressions,
we found that metaphorical concepts were always abstract
concepts (i.e., difficult to be experienced), whereas non-
metaphorical ones were more concrete (i.e., easy to be
experienced). In the conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980), non-metaphorical concepts include at least
(1) spatial orientations (e.g., UP–DOWN, IN–OUT, NEAR–
FAR, and FRONT–BACK), (2) ontological concepts arising in
physical experience (e.g., ENTITY, SUBSTANCE, CONTAINER,
and PERSON), and (3) structured experiences and activities
(e.g., EATING, MOVING, TRANSFERRING OBJECTS FROM
PLACE TO PLACE). Evidence in support of this theory came
from research on spatial metaphors, such as the POWER and
BIG–SMALL metaphor (Freedman, 1979; Lakoff and Johnson,
1980, 1999; Schubert et al., 2009; Yap et al., 2013), POWER
and UP–DOWN metaphor (Schubert, 2005; Meier et al., 2007;
Zanolie et al., 2012), TIME and UP–DOWN/LEFT–RIGHT
metaphor (Boroditsky, 2000; Fuhrman and Boroditsky, 2007;
Santiago et al., 2007; Liu and Zhang, 2009a,b; Ouellet et al.,
2009), TIME and LONG–SHORT metaphor (Casasanto and
Boroditsky, 2008; Zäch and Brugger, 2008; Chen and Zhang,
2011), and EMOTION and UP–DOWN metaphor (Stefanucci
and Storbeck, 2009; Lü and Lu, 2013). Evidence also came from
metaphors of structured experiences and activities, such as the
SOCIAL EMOTION and WARM–COLD metaphor (Williams
and Bargh, 2008; IJzerman and Semin, 2010; Bargh and Shalev,
2012; IJzerman et al., 2012) and EMOTION and FACIAL
EXPRESSION metaphor (Strack et al., 1988).
As a consequence, learning an abstract concept might be
directly facilitated by a metaphorical expression, in which there
is embodied mapping between bodily states and the concrete
concepts (i.e., “embodied schema” in short in the current
study). For example, when people learn the abstract concept
RELATIONSHIP and its metaphorical expression such as “We
are CLOSE friends,” all embodied information about NEAR–
FAR states could be activated and then affect the concept
RELATIONSHIP learning. If this argument were true, the
abstract-concrete mapping can be found in discussions in a more
general way. Here, we further reflect on whether there is also
mapping between two abstract concepts that share the same
experience information according to their embodied schema,
which was built by the relative concrete concepts and their
sensorimotor system.
In language processing, especially based on the amodal
symbols view (Burgess and Lund, 1997; Landauer and Dumais,
1997), robust priming effects have been widely found in
conditions in which primes and targets share the same
semantic or other common elements (Plaut, 1995; Bi et al.,
1998; Sun and Wang, 2012; Chen et al., 2016). One of
the typical examples is the DOCTOR–NURSE word pair, in
which both words belong to the same semantic network in
our mental lexicon. However, there is still a lack of research
on whether similar priming effects can be found between
primes and targets sharing common embodied information
(e.g., similar experience). It is not surprising that some
concepts, such as UP, can be used as the source domain
in different metaphorical/embodiment expressions: MORE is
UP, CONTROL is UP, GOOD is UP, RATIONAL is UP
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Therefore, there is common
embodied information among different target domains (e.g.,
MORE, CONTROL, GOOD, and RATIONAL). By contrast,
the same target domain can correspond to different source
domains. For example, TIME, as an abstract concept, has several
spatial embodied mappings, such as UP–DOWN, LEFT–RIGHT,
FRONT–BACK, and LONG–SHORT (Casasanto and Boroditsky,
2008; Zäch and Brugger, 2008; Chen and Zhang, 2011), and
some other valuable entailments (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
There comes the possibility: If the same embodied schema is
shared by two abstract concepts in our long-term memory, the
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schema might act as the common element and affect our concept
processing.
To investigate this possibility, we chose two concepts—TIME
and ABSTRACT ACTIONs— that they do not have directly
symbolic connections, and more importantly, that both match
the definition proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980): These two
concepts are understood and structured not merely on their own
terms, but also in terms of other concepts. Firstly, the perception
of TIME is part of human experience. Based on the experience of
the passage of time and anticipated duration, we make everyday
decisions, as simple as either waiting for the elevator or taking
the stairs (Wittmann and Paulus, 2008). However, “Time is
a sort of river of passing events, and strong is its current”
(Marcus Aurelius [translated version] Meditations, IV, 43, See
Liverence and Scholl, 2012, p. 549). The very expression “the
perception of time” invites objection because time is something
different from events. When we have “the perception of time,”
we indeed perceive embodied experiences such as SPATIAL
DISTANCEs and other relations between objects (Le Poidevin,
2011). Therefore, we might take stairs to the second floor but
wait for the elevator to the 20th. Distances (LONG/SHORT) are
different between these two conditions. Secondly, compared with
more concrete actions like KISS and STEP that can be seen and
understood directly, JUDGE and THINK are more abstract in
that they express mental processes, with no reference to a physical
object (Scorolli et al., 2012). These actions might have no direct
metaphorical mappings, but can be experienced as LONG or
SHORT. These experiences are very important for ABSTRACT
ACTIONs (Borghi and Cimatti, 2009, 2012), and they are always
reflected in our daily expressions, in a somewhat complicated
fashion.
For example, in the above elevator/stairs experiences of TIME,
distances from the starting point to the goal for specific durations
can be easily measured, but it is difficult to find a physically
corresponding length for ABSTRACT ACTIONs. Then what
could be the common element between TIME and ABSTRACT
ACTIONs? In our daily expressions, connections between TIME
and LENGTH (an hour is longer than a minute), and between
ABSTRACT ACTION and LENGTH (it took me a long time to
finish my homework) can be found. Therefore, no matter whether
it was an experience of an hour or of fulfilling an action, these can
be seen as events with starting and ending points, and the time
(duration) for accomplishing these events can be perceived. As a
consequence, LENGTH, specifically representing the experiences
from the starting point to the ending point of the given event,
can be considered as the common element shared by ABSTRACT
ACTIONs and TIME. Therefore, concepts involving ABSTRACT
ACTIONs (as indicated by the ratings made by participants in the
present study) and TIME are suitable for the present research.
Based on the relationships between TIME and LENGTH (i.e.,
involving metaphorical expressions), and ABSTRACT ACTIONs
and LENGTH (i.e., involving no metaphorical expressions
but only experiences), it is assumed that there might be an
“abstract-to-abstract” mapping with experience as the common
element (i.e., “ABSTRACT ACTION-LENGTH-TIME”) during
verb processing. In the present study, experience of TIME was
manipulated by LENGTH-changing events (i.e., length-changing
lines or duration-changing beeps). If this abstract-to-abstract
mapping can be quickly activated under the priming task,
verb processing should be facilitated by the TIME consistent
condition. In other words, the goal of this research was to
test whether mappings between two abstract concepts could
be connected by their common concrete concept in word
processing.
This hypothesis was tested in two experiments. In
Experiment 1, abstract words with different DURATION
mappings were primed by two kinds of length-changing lines, so
that the metaphorical priming effect could be detected under a
visual condition. For reasons of experimental rigor, Experiment
2 was arranged to be identical to Experiment 1 except the primes
used in Experiment 1 were changed in order to offset any tau
effect. The tau effect is a spatial perceptual illusion that reveals
that stimulus timing affects the perception of stimulus spacing:
The greater the difference between the temporal intervals, the
greater must be the spatial difference in the opposite sense in
order to offset the tau effect (Helson and King, 1931). There
are several explanations for this effect, and one of them is the
constant velocity hypothesis (Jones and Huang, 1982), according
to which the brain expects spatial intervals that would yield
movement with constant velocity. Though we did not use
temporal visual intervals, continuous lines might also cause this
expectation. Because this so-called tau effect might be involved
in Experiment 1, it is not quite clear whether the priming effect,
if any, would be caused by the “ABSTRACT ACTION-TIME”
mapping or by the “ABSTRACT ACTION-LENGTH (perception
of LENGTH caused by the tau effect)” mapping. Thus, in
Experiment 2, pure sound beeps with different durations were
presented as the primes instead of the length-changing line,
so that any influence of the tau effect could be reduced. The
common property shared by two kinds of prime in the present
study (a line in Experiment 1, a beep in Experiment 2) was that
participants could perceive experience from the starting point to
the ending point of the prime’s presentation.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-five right-handed Chinese native speakers took part in the
present study (Mage = 21.25, SD = 2.07; 12 male). Participants
gave informed consent before taking part in the experiment.
Materials
Eighty-five words (49 referring to long-time verbs, and 36
referring to short-time verbs) were selected from the Dictionary
of Modern Chinese Language (Institute of Language, 2008), and
60 students who did not take part in the main study completed
the following rating questionnaires (20 students for each). Firstly,
abstractive degree (abstractness) of candidates was rated on
a 7-point scale (1 = concrete action, 7 = abstract verb). In
addition, most of the Chinese words were multi-category words
such that verbs and nouns were sometimes difficult to identify.
Therefore, all candidate words were also rated according to their
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typical category on a 7-point scale (category rating, 1 = absolute
noun, 7 = absolute verb), and only words whose means of the
abstractive ratings and category ratings were higher than 5 were
chosen for use in the experiment. All these chosen candidates
were then rated according to their typical perception of duration
on a 7-point scale (1= such an action can be done in a very short
time, 7 = it takes a long time to finish such an action), and verbs
with ratings under 2.5 represented short-time verbs whereas
verbs with ratings over 5.5 represented long-time verbs. Finally,
46 target words, 23 referring to long-time abstract verbs (occur
over a longer period of time, e.g., - lingering, - tangle,
etc.) and 23 short-time abstract verbs (occur over a shorter period
of time, e.g., - hit, - breakdown, etc.) were selected
for the present study. The two metaphorical durations (long vs.
short) of the final selected words did not differ with respect to
their familiarity, t(44) = 0.29, p > 0.05, or their category ratings,
t(44) = 0.27, p > 0.05, but did differ significantly regarding
ratings of their length, t(44) = 39.22, p < 0.001. Moreover,
another 46 pseudo words were created as the filler probes so that
the number of Yes and No answers could be balanced (details are
in Table 1).
In addition, two length-changing lines displayed as primes
were created by Macromedia Flash MX 2004. One line was
differentiated from the other by its duration. Duration from the
starting point to completion of the final line (P-L duration) was
2000 ms for the long-time prime (10 visual-pictures per second),
whereas the P-L duration for the short-time prime was 500 ms (40
visual-pictures per second). Therefore, both of these lines were
visually of the same length when in the final position.
Apparatus and Procedure
A priming lexical decision task without feedback was used.
The experimental software E-Prime presented the stimuli and
recorded reaction times. Control files were constructed to
display stimuli on a 17-inch IBM (9512-AB1) monitor (screen
resolution: 1024 pixels × 768 pixels). Participants were tested
individually in a sound-proof room. All priming lines were
started from the left (X: 25% Y : 50%) of the screen to the
right (X: 75% Y : 50%). Targets were presented in the center
of the monitor. Each trial started with the presentation of a
fixation cross for 500 ms. The fixation cross was replaced by
a length-changing line (500 or 2000 ms), which was followed
by the target display for maximum 2000 ms. Participants were
asked to judge as quickly and as accurately as possible whether
TABLE 1 | Item characteristics for the final selected targets.
Variables controlled Long-time verbs Short-time verbs
M SD M SD
Abstractness 5.50 0.33 5.52 0.32
Familiarity 5.64 0.45 5.68 0.47
Category rating 5.06 0.70 5.18 0.63
Typical perception of duration∗∗∗ 5.83 0.32 2.03 0.33
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
or not the target in each trial was a real word, and to press
the corresponding button on a response box. The inter-trial
interval was 500 ms (blank screen) and then the next trial
started (see Figure 1). If the participant failed to respond in
2000 ms, the trial was terminated and recorded as an error.
Participants received 10 practice trials, for which feedback was
provided.
Results and Discussion
Participants’ mean latencies (based on untrimmed correct
responses) and error rates are summarized in Table 2, and
graphically presented in Figure 2. Analyses of variance (2 × 2
ANOVAs) were conducted with priming type (duration for
the priming lines: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) and word type
(different metaphorical time length for words) as within-subject
factors and with latencies (ms) and error rates (%) as the
dependent variables. In addition, as evidence showed that
responses to real words and non-words might reflect different
mechanisms during word accessing (Yang et al., 2006), latencies
and error rates of non-words were submitted to separate
t-tests.
Results of the analyses on latency showed a significant
difference between long-time priming (M = 657 ms) and short-
time priming (M = 615 ms), F1(1,34) = 28.88, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.46, F2(1,22) = 23.27, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.51, and
between long-time concepts (M = 629 ms) and short-time
concepts (M = 643 ms), F1(1,34) = 4.30, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.11,
F2(1,22) = 2.27, p > 0.10. Importantly, the interaction
between priming type and word type reached significance,
F1(1,34)= 16.53, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.33, F2(1,22)= 4.09, p= 0.056,
η2 = 0.16. A further simple effect test showed that when primed
by the long-time line, long-time concepts produced significantly
smaller latency scores than short-time concepts, F1(1,34)= 14.09,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.29, F2(1,22) = 31.10, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.59,
whereas when primed by the short-time line, long-time concepts
produced significantly larger latency scores than short-time
concepts, F1(1,34)= 9.08, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.21, F2(1,22) < 1, ns.
Similar analyses were done on error rates and results showed a
significant difference between long-time priming and short-time
priming, F1(1,34) = 5.56, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.14, F2(1,22) = 1.82,
p > 0.10, but the main effect of word type was missing,
F1(1,34) = 1.74, p > 0.05, F2(1,22) < 1, ns. Importantly,
the interaction between priming type and word type also
reached significance, F1(1,34) = 13.24, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.28,
F2(1,22) = 5.71, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.21. A further simple effect
test showed that long-time concepts primed by the long-time
line produced significantly higher error rates than short-time
concepts primed by the long-time line, F1(1,34)= 11.70, p< 0.01,
η2 = 0.26, F2(1,22)= 5.96, p< 0.05, η2 = 0.21; by contrast, long-
time concepts primed by the short-time line produced somewhat
lower error rates than short-time concepts primed by the short-
time line, F1(1,34) = 3.50, p = 0.07, η2 = 0.09, F2(1,22) = 1.21,
p> 0.10.
The interaction between priming type and word type suggests
that experience of TIME might act as mediator in the mapping
between ABSTRACT ACTIONS and LENGTH. On the one
hand, such findings are consistent with the view that TIME
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FIGURE 1 | Example trial procedure in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, pure sound beeps with different durations were displayed instead of the length-changing
line.
TABLE 2 | Means of latencies (SE) and error rates (SE) in Experiment 1.
Long-time priming Short-time priming
Long-time concepts Short-time concepts Non-words Long-time concepts Short-time concepts Non-words
Latencies 631 (16) 684 (23) 677 (21) 628 (17) 602 (14) 612 (19)
Error rates 2.91 (0.62) 5.46 (0.83) 3.34 (0.69) 3.94 (0.67) 1.51 (0.39) 2.27 (0.59)
FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean latencies and mean standard errors in Experiment 1. (B) Mean error rates and mean standard errors in Experiment 1.
itself is not a property in the empirical world (Wittmann,
2009). When we talk about time (e.g., “an event lasted a
long time,” “time flew by”), we use linguistic structures that
refer to motion events and to locations and measures in
space (Evans, 2004, see Wittmann, 2009). On the other hand,
though VERBs used in the present study were somewhat
abstractive, they are still relevant to corresponding motion
events that people experience as time pressure (e.g., it takes
seconds/minutes/hours to finish some ACTIONs) during concept
learning (or everyday life). Thus, it was assumed that both TIME
and ABSTRACT VERBs can be mapped to the same experience
(i.e., experience of duration from starting point to ending point
of the length-changing line) and interact with each other in the
priming paradigm. The present results were in line with this
hypothesis.
In addition, long-term priming trials showed disadvantages,
no mater whether the following stimulus was a real word or a
non-word. We believed that these findings could be explained
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by processing of internal analog (Moyer, 1973), which will be
discussed later again with data of Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
The hypothesis of the “ABSTRACT ACTION-LENGTH-TIME”
mapping actually referred to an “abstract concept-to-abstract
concept” mapping in the present research. However, though
Experiment 1 showed that the LENGTH of TIME influences
subsequent lexical decisions, the perception of time might
become the perception of length of line under visual priming
because of the tau effect. In what was probably the first
experiment of this type, Benussi (1913, see Sarrazin et al.,
2004) presented participants with three successive flashes of light
defining two spatial and two temporal interstimulus intervals
(ISIs). Distance judgments were found to vary as a function of the
duration of the temporal ISIs (Sarrazin et al., 2004). Since then,
many studies—involving the visual (Bill and Teft, 1969), auditory
(Cohen et al., 1953), or kinesthetic (Helson and King, 1931;
Lechelt and Bochert, 1977) modality—have shown that when
two constant spatial ISIs are associated with variable temporal
ISIs, distance is overestimated or underestimated in accordance
with the temporal ISI. Though in Experiment 1 we did not
have temporal ISIs, but continuous length-changing lines instead,
expectation of movement with constant velocity from the starting
point to the end of these lines still existed and there might be a
similar tau effect involved in the results of Experiment 1. That is,
participants might have perceived the changes of lines (concrete
experience), thus affecting the following task. Therefore, instead
of visual primes, beeps with different durations were used in
Experiment 2 so that the abstractive property of priming could
be more carefully manipulated.
Method
Participants
Another 36 right-handed Chinese native speakers, who did not
participate in Experiment 1, took part (Mage = 21.65, SD = 2.32;
13 male). Participants gave informed consent before taking part
in the experiment.
Materials
Target words were identical to Experiment 1, but the visually
length-changing lines were replaced by auditory pure sound
(“beep”). A 500 ms beep was created by Ulead Video Studio 12 for
short-time priming while a 2000 ms beep was used for long-time
priming.
Apparatus and Procedure
Experimental tasks were identical to Experiment 1, except that
control files were constructed to play auditory primes through
headphones (IRIVER AIRUNKE AE1) to participants, who were
tested individually in a sound-proof room.
Results and Discussion
Participants’ mean latencies (based on untrimmed correct
responses) and error rates are summarized in Table 3, and
graphically presented in Figure 3. Analyses of variance (2 × 2
ANOVAs) were conducted identical to those in Experiment 1.
Results of the analyses on latency showed a significant
difference between long-time priming (M = 744 ms) and short-
time priming (M = 673 ms), F1(1,35) = 46.10, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.56, F2(1,22) = 30.91, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.58, and a
marginally significant, but unreliable 17-ms, difference between
long-time concepts (M = 717 ms) and short-time concepts
(M = 700 ms), F1(1,35)= 3.81, p= 0.06, η2 = 0.10, F2(1,22)< 1,
ns. Again, the interaction between priming type and word type
reached significance, F1(1,35) = 10.17, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.23,
F2(1,22) = 7.79, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.26. A further simple effect
test showed that long-time concepts primed by the long-time
beep produced significantly smaller latency scores than short-
time concepts primed by the long-time beep, F1(1,35) = 24.78,
p< 0.01, η2 = 0.42, F2(1,22)= 5.18, p< 0.05, η2 = 0.19, whereas
a difference between long-time and short-time concepts primed
by the short-time beep was not found, F1(1,35) = 0.30, p > 0.05,
F2(1,22)= 4.67, p< 0.05, η2 = 1.75.
Results of error rates showed a significant difference between
long-time priming and short-time priming, F1(1,35) = 4.78,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.12, F2(1,22) = 4.52, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.17, but
the main effect of word type was again missing, F1(1,35) = 0.01,
p > 0.10, F2(1,22) = 2.54, p > 0.10. Importantly, the interaction
between priming type and word type reached significance,
F1(1,35) = 16.28, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.32, F2(1,22) = 14.45,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.40. A further simple effect test showed
that when primed by the long-time BEEP, long-time concepts
produced significantly lower error rates than short-time concepts,
F1(1,35) = 9.51, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.21, F2(1,22) = 14.82, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.40; however, when primed by the short-time BEEP,
long-time concepts produced higher error rates than short-time
concepts, F1(1,35) = 7.35, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.17, F2(1,22) = 3.61,
p= 0.07, η2 = 0.14.
Under the auditory priming, the interaction between priming
type and word type (i.e., difference between RTs of long-time
and short-time words under the short-time priming condition)
was a bit weakened but still apparent. These findings suggest that
the priming effect was still a stable event without the concrete
experience (e.g., expectation of movement of constant velocity in
Experiment 1). According to the results of Experiments 1 and 2,
the hypothesis of the “ABSTRACT ACTION-LENGTH-TIME”
mapping was partly proved.
Moreover, similar to the pattern that was found in Experiment
1, long-term priming trials showed disadvantages on both
real and non-words. These findings indicated that priming
lines (Experiment 1) and beeps (Experiment 2) were actually
processed in the current task, and they then affected the
following lexical decision task. In one of Moyer’s (1973) studies,
a size comparison task was designed to manipulate various
size differences. Results showed that smaller size differences
between target pairs lengthened RTs and increased error rates
relative to larger size differences. Moyer believed that participants
built “internal analogs” of the given stimuli and did “internal
psychophysical (differences) judgment” in the task. The smaller
the size differences were, the more difficult the judgment to be
made.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1623
fpsyg-07-01623 October 20, 2016 Time: 19:42 # 7
Chen et al. The Common Element Effect in Abstract-to-Abstract Mapping
TABLE 3 | Means of latencies (SE) and error rates (SE) in Experiment 2.
Long-time priming Short-time priming
Long-time concepts Short-time concepts Non-words Long-time concepts Short-time concepts Non-words
Latencies 723 (29) 765 (29) 733 (28) 677 (21) 669 (24) 660 (20)
Error rates 2.54 (0.54) 8.21 (1.83) 4.35 (0.87) 4.59 (1.17) 2.05 (0.45) 3.27 (0.71)
FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean latencies and mean standard errors in Experiment 2. (B) Mean error rates and mean standard errors in Experiment 2.
Similarly, we believed that “internal analogs” of the given
lines and beeps were also built during the present priming stage.
However, different from research by Moyer (1973), processing of
internal analogs in the present study was based on the “size (i.e.,
length)” of the given stimuli, rather than “size differences” of the
stimulus pairs. According to opinion expressed in the literature
(Kosslyn et al., 1978, 1979; Kosslyn, 1981), it took a longer
time to process larger/longer internal analogs than shorter ones.
Therefore, disadvantages were found with long-term priming
trials, but not short-term priming trials.
In addition, although responses to real words and non-
words should not be statistically compared (Yang et al., 2006),
it was quite clear in both experiments that responses to
non-words were slower than those to real words under the
consistent condition but quicker than those to real words under
the inconsistent condition. These results could be considered
as further support for the hypothesis of the “ABSTRACT
ACTION-LENGTH-TIME” mapping. That is, participants built
the “length” mapping for the words (i.e., ABSTRACT ACTION)
while they were building the “length” mapping for the primes
(i.e., TIME). In the after-priming stage, processing should
begin with accessing the word meaning and end up with the
“length” consistency processing (between primes and words).
Thus, there might be three kinds of effects in the present
study: facilitation (e.g., under the length consistent condition),
conflict (e.g., under the length inconsistent condition), or
no interaction (e.g., under the non-word condition). Neither
facilitation nor confliction could exist between primes and
non-words because there were no “length” mappings for these
words.
Therefore, the present results might be caused by building
different “internal analogs” of the given primes (i.e., significant
differences between responses under long- and short-term
priming conditions), and also by the different consistencies of
“length” mappings between primes and words (i.e., differences
among consistent, inconsistent, and non-word conditions).
However, these explanations were not convincing enough until
further evidence was provided. Thus, the interactions between
priming type and word type for the real words will be the main
focus in the section “General Discussion.”
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous studies on embodied mappings have all focused on two
concepts of which at least one was concrete, such as TIME and
LENGTH (Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Chen and Zhang,
2011), POWER and SIZE (Freedman, 1979; Lakoff and Johnson,
1980, 1999; Schubert et al., 2009; Yap et al., 2013), POWER
and ORIENTATION (Schubert, 2005; Meier et al., 2007; Zanolie
et al., 2012). These previous studies have focused on embodied
mappings separately, but some so-called common elements (i.e.,
concrete concepts in more than one mapping) exist in some
mappings (e.g., MORE is UP, CONTROL is UP, GOOD is UP,
RATIONAL is UP, see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Therefore, it
has been an open question whether there is mapping between two
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abstract concepts, when these concepts share common elements.
This is the first study to test the possibility of this type of
mapping. We found a robust priming effect when the primes and
targets shared the same experience of length (TIME consistent
condition), which was used as an index to test our hypothesis.
Based on these findings, we propose a dynamic conceptual model
in which mappings between concepts are influenced by common
shared elements.
Firstly, our findings extend previous studies on embodiment
theory. The most important extension is the idea that abstract
concepts should be involved in our embodied schema, at
least indirectly. To date, concrete concepts were considered
the main part of embodied schema in the literature (Scorolli
et al., 2012; Sakreida et al., 2013) and no mappings between
two abstract concepts were discussed in relation to this
schema. This is because researchers believed that “in general,
abstract concepts are defined metaphorically in terms of
concepts that are more concrete and more clearly structured
on their own terms” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 198).
However, the embodied schema should be more complex.
Findings from neuro-scientific studies on processing linguistic
concreteness and abstractness showed that the sensorimotor
neural network was engaged in processing abstract concepts
but rather less so in processing concrete concepts (Scorolli
et al., 2012; Sakreida et al., 2013). According to these findings,
the embodied schema might be directly built by concrete
concepts and their relative embodied simulations, and then
the metaphorical connections between concrete and abstract
concepts help build indirect connections between abstract
concepts and the embodied simulations. In other words, if
we think carefully about the relations among experience,
language, and thoughts, we know we should build a more
complex conceptual mapping: Those common concrete concepts
and their relative embodied experiences help connect two
abstract concepts, and the conceptual mappings should be
built up not only with the connections between abstract and
concrete concepts, but also with connections between abstract
concepts.
Actually, this claim is also consistent with the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, which pointed toward the possibility that
grammatical differences reflect differences in the way that
speakers of different languages perceive the world (for reviews,
see Kay and Kempton, 1984). That is, the language we
speak affects how we think about the world (Kay and
Kempton, 1984; Hunt and Agnoli, 1991), and language is a
powerful tool in shaping thought, especially habitual thought,
about abstract domains (Boroditsky, 2001). Here, the notion
of “thought” or “the way that we perceive the world”
refers to the non-linguistic cognitive structures (Kay and
Kempton, 1984), and, in the present study, precisely refers
to the connections between concepts. Therefore, combining
the embodiment theory (i.e., experience influences concrete
concepts’ learning and use) and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
(i.e., language/daily expression builds connections between
concepts), we can infer a pathway for building up the
embodied schema between abstract concepts and experiences:
Experience + language (or metaphorical mappings between
concrete and abstract concepts) thoughts. Using the connection
among the concepts of ACTION, TIME, and LENGTH as
an example: If LONG–SHORT experiences of events shape
expressions such as “an hour is longer than a minute”
and “it took me a long time to finish my homework,”
then these expressions shape our thoughts, i.e., connections
between concepts. The process of how people build up these
expressions will be discussed again later. According to most
of the recent literature, we believe these shaped thoughts
(connections between concepts) finally affect the embodiment
effects. Specifically in the present work, we argue that connections
between two abstract concepts should exist in the conceptual
mapping schema.
Next, we draw analogies between the amodal symbols view
and embodiment theory according to the present findings,
and we propose a dynamic system of word processing. When
word processing was discussed in the literature under the
amodal symbols view (Burgess and Lund, 1997; Landauer and
Dumais, 1997), priming lexical decisions were always found
to be affected by common elements between the prime and
target in a symbolic system. These symbolic systems include a
perceptual representation system (Tulving and Schacter, 1990;
Marsolek et al., 1992), phonological system (Lukatela and Turvey,
1991, 1994; Lesch and Pollatsek, 1993; Harm and Seidenberg,
1999), orthographical system (Leck et al., 1995; Xu et al.,
1999; Zhang and Weekes, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009; Zou et al.,
2012; Chen et al., 2014), and semantic system (Plaut, 1995; Bi
et al., 1998; Sun and Wang, 2012). When we learn a word,
we also build up a complicated network for it. For example,
when we learn the word SOFA, experience, such as seeing
a picture of a sofa, or touching a real sofa, might help us
to know what a sofa is. More importantly, we also learn
SOFA is a kind of furniture and that it is usually put into
a building, like chairs, tables, bed, etc., which can be used
in our everyday life. Therefore, “a piece of furniture” and
“we can use it every day” are common elements for sofa,
chair, table, and bed. Some common elements are clear and
direct (e.g., phonological and/or orthographical information
such as the upper portion of the characters “ ” and “ ”,
“word” and “work”), while some are more abstractive (e.g.,
semantic information). All this symbolic information will be
encoded in our long-term memory, and affect our word
processing.
Though symbolic information discussed under the amodal
symbols view was not focused on under the traditional
paradigm for discussing embodiment, researchers were actually
also looking for some common elements. However, previous
research has focused on common elements between two concrete
concepts, and between concrete and abstract concepts, and until
now there was still a lack of research on common elements
between two abstract concepts. According to this point of view,
we chose two concepts, TIME and ABSTRACT ACTIONs, which
are both abstractive and have similar properties in the present
study: Both TIME and ABSTRACT ACTIONs cannot be seen
or touched; “experience” of these two concepts must be based
on some other concrete concepts; it is never clear how “long”
a time it is if it is discussed without specific events. At the
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same time, though people can feel how long an action lasts,
this action cannot be physically measured as long or short,
either. Importantly, these two concepts have some common
elements: They both have long-short expression, but this long
or short property cannot be directly measured. Findings in both
experiments indicated that priming from the perception of time
did influence the following word processing. There was mapping
between the perception of TIME and ABSTRACT ACTIONs
used in the present study, although they were both abstract. As
the experimental manipulation in the present study, information
about LENGTH might be the common element between two
abstract concepts.
However, how do TIME, ABSTRACT ACTIONs, and
LENGTH connect to each other? Metaphor is first of all a
phenomenon of pragmatics. For example, when we talk about
spatial metaphors, we can find metaphorical expressions such
as “we grow close to (or far apart from) people,” or “one
friend is at the top of the class” (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson,
1980). The experience of “close” and “top” lets us build spatial
schemas for abstract concepts such as RELATIONSHIPs and
REPUTATION (Boroditsky, 2000; Meier et al., 2007; Schubert
et al., 2009). We can easily find a direct connection between
TIME and LENGTH in our daily expressions (an hour is longer
than a minute), whereas the connection between ABSTRACT
ACTION and LENGTH is not so close (it took me a long
time to finish my homework). It is not surprising that these
expressions differ because “we perceive durations as being filled
by particular events” (Liverence and Scholl, 2012). However,
experience of ABSTRACT ACTION could be gathered and
such abstract concepts could be learned during our lifetime
(Chen and Zhu, 2014). In addition, it seems that ABSTRACT
ACTIONs should be more closely connected to TIME than
to LENGTH. Therefore, we assumed there would be direct
mappings between ABSTRACT ACTIONs and TIME. Indeed,
this is what we found. More importantly, by manipulating
the displayed LENGTH of an event, we showed that TIME
affects the accessing of ABSTRACT ACTIONs. During long-time
language use, the indirectly embodied connection of ABSTRACT
ACTION-TIME is built. This connection affects our word
processing.
These elements might not be clear or direct, but they
did build the connection between two symbolic “unrelated”
concepts. These connections were a function of experience
during concept learning. For example, the perception of time
is part of human experience; it is essential for everyday
behavior and for the survival of the individual organism (Pöppel,
1997; Buhusi and Meck, 2005; Wittmann, 2009). Then how
can we “experience” that an hour is longer than a minute
(LONG–SHORT metaphor for TIME; see Chen and Zhang,
2011)? At least we can walk a longer distance in an hour
than in a minute. Through this experience, the concrete
concept of distance becomes the connection between TIME
and SPATIAL INFORMATION. Therefore, the key problem
was the same under the present experimental tasks: whether
there are common elements between two concepts stored in
our long-term memory that can be used in accessing words.
Therefore, the common element for TIME and ABSTRACT
ACTIONs was the connection to LENGTH, though the
strength of connection between TIME and LENGTH, and
between ABSTRACT ACTION and LENGTH, might not be the
same.
We claim that the “common element” could be the key to
combining discussion about word processing under the amodal
symbols view and discussion about accessing concepts under
embodiment theory. In other words, common elements, either
coming from a symbolic system or an embodied system, can
facilitate word processing. More importantly, people might
flexibly choose whatever is important and when the chosen
element should be used. This assumption is one of the plausible
explanations for some inconsistent findings under embodiment
theory. Some studies have found effects of abstract domain
processing on concrete domain processing; based on these
results, some researchers have claimed that concrete domains are
automatically activated by the situation, and then structure the
abstract domains and frame the understanding and reasoning
about them (Teuscher et al., 2008; Weger and Pratt, 2008; Ouellet
et al., 2010). In contrast, some researchers have argued that
the relational structure is stored with the abstract domains,
allowing the processing of the abstract domains without having
to activate the concrete domains (Santiago et al., 2011). We
believe that these different findings are due to what kind of
element or information was chosen by participants in the given
tasks.
For example, Chinese characters used in the present
study hold explicit symbolic information, such as “ -
resist”, in which “ ” always exists in characters that relate
to actions by hands, such as “ -against” and “ -beat
back.” Thus, symbolic information provided by “ ” could
be strongly activated in some studies (Zhang et al., 2014a,b;
Ma et al., 2015). By contrast, according to the present
findings, using common elements was more effective than
symbolic information under the present paradigm. Therefore,
a dynamic conceptual model should be proposed: Our
mental conceptual system was built up by several kinds of
information, and we choose the most important or available
information under the given task. Thus, the flexible accessing
process should be the essence of the dynamic conceptual
model.
In addition, we do not argue that mapping between abstract
concepts could be as strong as that between an abstract concept
and a concrete concept. Compared with the properties of
priming in Experiment 2, the length-changing lines used in
Experiment 1 were more concrete and their starting point and
ending point were more easily captured. As a consequence,
length-changing lines produced a larger difference between the
consistent and inconsistent priming condition. We believe that
besides perceptual information of TIME, length-changing lines
might provide concrete information that is more easily activated
or accessed, a conjecture that still needs more evidence to
prove. Moreover, in the present dynamic system we propose,
common embodied information might have less of an effect
on concrete-concrete words’ mapping. For example, there are
several spatial mappings (e.g., UP–DOWN, LEFT–RIGHT, and
LONG–SHORT) for TIME, but the experience of TIME, which
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can be seen as a common element among the above mentioned
concrete concepts, should not facilitate spatial–spatial (e.g., “UP–
DOWN”-“LEFT–RIGHT”) concepts’ mapping. That is, a concept
must first be important to another given concept, and then it
becomes the common element.
CONCLUSION
The more information received, including symbolic or
embodied information, the more easily the concept can be
accessed.
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